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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ROBERT PAUL PACHECO,

)

Petitioner-Appellant, J:

Case No. 900015-CA

4

V •

M. ELDON BARNES, Warden,
Utah State Prison,

ii

Category No. 3

Respondent-Appellee.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a denial of a petition for
postconviction relief in the Third Judicial District Court.

This

Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(g) (Supp. 1990), as the appeal is from an order
on a petition for postconviction relief challenging a conviction
of less than a first degree felony.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Did the habeas court properly determine that

petitioner was not denied effective assistance of counsel at
trial by counsel's failure to move the court for a reduction of
the crime charged from burglary to criminal trespass?

On appeal

from the denial of postconviction relief, "we survey the record
in the light most favorable to the findings and judgment; and we
will not reverse if there is a reasonable basis therein to
support the trial court's refusal to be convinced that the writ

should be granted."

Medina v. Cook, 779 P.2d 658, 658-59 (Utah

1989).
2.

Did the habeas court properly find that petitioner

did not timely inform his trial counsel about the relationship of
Juror Lucero to himself, and did the habeas court properly find
that petitioner was not denied the effective assistance of
counsel on that basis?

The same standard as given in the first

issue applies to this issue as well.
3.

Does this point raise any issue which is not

addressed in the first two points of the brief?

If any new issue

is raised in this point, petitioner has failed to provide legal
analysis to support the new claim.

This Court should decline to

address any issues for which legal analysis has not been
provided.

State v. Amicone# 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The language of the provisions upon which the State

relies is included in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner was convicted after a jury trial of
burglary, a second degree felony, and theft, a class B
misdemeanor.

He appealed his conviction, alleging that the

evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, that the
pretrial identification procedures were so suggestive that his
due process rights were violated, and that he was prejudiced by
the admission into evidence of a photo array and by the admission
for impeachment purposes of petitioner's prior conviction.
Court affirmed petitioner's conviction.

This

See State v. Pacheco,

778 P.2d 26 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (A copy of the decision is
attached as Addendum A ) .
On July 20, 1989, petitioner filed a petition for
postconviction relief in the Third Judicial District Court,
before the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup (Record [hereafter R.] at 241).

Pro bono counsel was appointed for petitioner on August 17,

1989 and an evidentiary hearing was held on November 29, 1989 (R.
at 128). At the conclusion of the hearing, the court denied the
petition.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The facts pertinent to this appeal are contained in the
statement of the case.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The habeas court properly found that petitioner was not
denied effective assistance of counsel at trial by counsel's
failure to move the court for a reduction of the crime charged
from burglary to criminal trespass.
Petitioner did not timely inform his trial counsel
about the relationship of Juror Lucero to himself and, therefore,
the habeas court properly found that petitioner was not denied
the effective assistance of counsel.
Petitioner does not raise any issues in point III of
his brief which were not raised in points I and II.

If any of

the material in point III could be construed as raising a
separate issue, this Court should to address the issue because
petitioner has not provided legal analysis for any new claim.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE HABEAS COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT
PETITIONER WAS NOT DENIED EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT TRIAL BY COUNSEL'S
FAILURE TO MOVE THE COURT FOR A REDUCTION IN
THE CRIME CHARGED FROM BURGLARY TO CRIMINAL
TRESPASS•
In his petition for postconviction relief, petitioner
claimed, inter alia, that his counsel provided ineffective
assistance because counsel failed to move for reduction of the
burglary charge to one of criminal trespass.

This argument

appears to be based on an argument that burglary and trespass are
the same crime and petitioner is entitled to conviction for the
lesser offense.

A second argument appears to be that the crimes

are different but that there was no evidence of theft, so
petitioner should have been convicted of trespass rather than
burglary.
In Medina v. Cook, 779 P.2d 658 (Utah 1989), the Utah
Supreme Court stated that on appeal from denial of habeas corpus
relief, "we survey the record in the light most favorable to the
findings and judgment; and we will not reverse if there is a
reasonable basis therein to support the trial court's refusal to
be convinced that the writ should be granted."

Id. at 658-59.

In order to prevail on his claim that his trial counsel
provided ineffective assistance, petitioner must meet the
standard delineated by the United States Supreme Court in
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
Court said:

.d.

In that case, the

Firstf the defendant must show that counsel's
performance was deficient. • . . Second/ the
defendant must show that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense.

[A] court must indulge a strong presumption
that counsel's conduct falls within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance;
that is, the defendant must overcome the
presumption that, under the circumstances/
the challenged action "might be considered
sound trial strategy."
Strickland/ 466 U.S. at 687/ 689 (citations omitted).

The Utah

Supreme Court has expounded on this standard in several cases.
In Codianna v. Morrisf 660 P.2d 1101 (Utah 1983)/ the court said:
The burden of establishing inadequate
representation is on the defendant, "and
proof of such must be a demonstrable reality
and not a speculative matter." . . . A
lawyer's "legitimate exercise of judgment" in
the choice of trial strategy or tactics that
did not produce the anticipated result does
not constitute ineffective assistance of
counsel. . . . It must appear that any
deficiency in the performance of counsel was
prejudicial.
Id. at 1109 (citations omitted).

See also State v. Frame, 723

P.2d 401/ 405 (Utah 1986).
Petitioner has the burden to show that counsel's
performance was deficient and that that deficiency prejudiced the
defendant.

Defendant has not met this burden.

For this reason,

his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was rejected by
the habeas court and should be rejected by this Court.

Judge

Rigtrup properly found that "petitioner has not demonstrated a
substantial denial of his constitutional rights."

Judge Rigtrup

further found that "petitioner has not demonstrated that his
criminal trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance" and that

"the Court must consider the conduct of trial counsel very
carefully, with the presumption that trial counsel acted
correctly unless petitioner demonstrates actual prejudice to
himself from counsel's conduct" (R. at 133; a copy of the court's
findings and conclusions are attached as Addendum B ) .
Defendant is required to show that, absent the trial
errors, there was a reasonable probability of a more favorable
result.

The mere fact that a defendant receives an unfavorable

result does not give rise to the conclusion that his trial
counsel's performance was deficient.

See State v. Montes, 151

Utah Adv. Rep. 28 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); State v. Hoyt, 153 Utah
Adv. Rep. 16 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); State v. Velarde, 154 Utah
Adv. Rep. 27 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Petitioner first maintains that counsel provided
ineffective assistance by failing to move for reduction of the
burglary charge to a charge of criminal trespass.

Petitioner

argues that there is overlap between the two crimes and that Utah
Code Ann. § 77-17-1 (1990) mandates that he be convicted of the
lower degree.

That provisions readsz

When it appears the defendant has
committed a public offense and there is
reasonable doubt as to which of two or more
degrees he is guilty, he shall be convicted
only of the lower degree.
The statute applies only if there is a reasonable doubt as to
which degree petitioner was guilty of.

In the case of the

overlapping charges of criminal trespass and burglary, there are
two elements which, if proven, make a person guilty of the
greater offense.

If a person enters or remains unlawfully in a
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building (as opposed to "on property") and with the intent to
commit a felony or theft or an assault, the person is guilty of
burglary, not criminal trespass.

In petitioner's case, there was

no reasonable doubt that he entered a building (the victims's
house) and that he did it with the intent to commit a theft.
Petitioner was convicted by a jury of burglary and theft.
Pacheco, 778 P.2d at 28. This Court affirmed that conviction,
finding, inter alia, that there was sufficient evidence to
support petitioner's conviction for theft.

Id. at 27.

Since the

jury and this court have determined that petitioner committed
theft while burglarizing the victims's home, there is no
reasonable doubt as to which crime or degree of conviction
petitioner is guilty.

Consequently, petitioner's claim that his

counsel was ineffective for failing to move for reduction of the
charge must fail.
At the evidentiary hearing on his petition, petitioner
focused on a claim that trial counsel was ineffective because
counsel did not challenge the evidence that money had been taken.
In denying petitioner's claim that trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to challenge the evidence, Judge Rigtrup held:
3. That it was an exercise of judgment
for petitioner's criminal trial counsel to
decide not to challenge the issue of whether
money was actually taken during the burglary.
4. That petitioner's criminal trial
counsel properly sought to avoid the
appearance of taking inconsistent positions
when he chose to not challenge the theft
issue.
5. That petitioner's theory of the
criminal case was that petitioner was not
present at the victims' house during the
burglary and theft and that petitioner's
criminal trial counsel followed that theory.

Counsel could have probed the theft issue
further but did not provide ineffective
assistance when he did not do so.
(R. at 132; Addendum B).
Petitioner claims that his counsel was ineffective
because counsel did not pursue a trial strategy which called for
requesting a motion to reduce the charge from burglary to
criminal trespass.

As cited above, an attorney's exercise of

judgment in choice of trial strategy is not grounds for a claim
of ineffective assistance if the strategy does not achieve the
anticipated result.

See Codianna, 660 P.2d at 1109. At

petitioner's criminal trial, his defense was that he was not the
person seen in, or leaving, the victim's home.

He presented

evidence that he had loaned his car to his estranged son the day
of the crime, and he maintained that he was not the individual at
the home.

The issue was one of identification, not one of

whether a theft occurred.

Pacheco, 778 P.2d at 28.

Based on

defendant's representations to his counsel that he was not at the
victims's home on that day, counsel pursued the trial strategy of
attacking the eyewitnesses' identifications of petitioner.

To

have followed the course petitioner now urges would have put
counsel in the untenable position of arguing to the jury that
petitioner was not guilty because he was not here; but, if he was
there, he did not take anything.

Counsel appropriately followed

a single theory of the case which afforded petitioner his best
chance of acquittal.

The habeas court determined that that

strategy was appropriate and that petitioner had not demonstrated
that trial counsel had provided ineffective counsel.

There is

nothing in the record of petitioner's postconviction proceeding
which overcomes the deference to the habeas court's findings and
judgment established by Medina v, Cookf 779 P.2d 658, 658-59
(Utah 1989).
POINT II
THE HABEAS COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT
PETITIONER DID NOT TIMELY ADVISE HIS TRIAL
COUNSEL ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP OF JUROR
LUCERO TO HIMSELF AND, THEREFORE, PETITIONER
WAS NOT DENIED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL.
Petitioner next claims that his counsel was ineffective
because counsel did not challenge a juror named Michael Lucero
who, petitioner maintains, was related to petitioner and may have
had ill will toward petitioner.

Petitioner claimed in his

petition for postconviction relief that Lucero falsely denied
being related and that counsel was aware of that falsity.
Petitioner did not support this claim at the evidentiary hearing
and the habeas court determined that petitioner had not met his
burden that counsel was ineffective on this issue (R. at 134;
Addendum B ) .
In the findings of fact and conclusions of law signed
by Judge Rigtrup after the evidentiary hearing, the court found
that "the jury had been selected and the first day of
petitioner's criminal trial commenced when petitioner raised the
issue of a possible conflict with one of the jurors" (R. at 133;
Addendum B).

In State v. Harrison, 152 Utah Adv. Rep. 19 (Utah

Ct. App. Jan. 14, 1991), this Court held that a challenge to an
individual juror may be made only before the jury is sworn,
except the court may, for good cause, permit it to be made after

the juror is sworn but before any of the evidence is presented.
The habeas court's determination that petitioner had raised this
issue in an untimely fashion is based on petitioner's own
testimony at the evidentiary hearing (R. at 148-56; a copy of the
transcript pages is attached as Addendum C).

Petitioner himself

had not known of the relationship or recognized the juror when
the jury was being selected (R. at 150; Addendum C).

It was

petitioner's mother who heard the name and asked petitioner to
describe the juror who told petitioner that the juror was
petitioner's sister's brother-in-law (R. at 150; Addendum C).

On

the stand, petitioner admitted that Lucero may have been just as
ignorant of a possible relationship as he himself; in other
words, that Lucero was not lying when he claimed no relationship
to petitioner (R. at 153; Addendum C).
Judge Rigtrup further held that "the record is scant on
the inability of the juror of which petitioner complains to act
impartially in petitioner's trial.

Petitioner merely supposes

that the juror would not have acted impartially because of an
alleged conflict between the juror and petitioner's father" (R.
at 133; Addendum B).

This failure to meet his burden of showing

bias on the part of Lucero also defeats petitioner's claim of
ineffective assistance.

Petitioner's mother submitted an

affidavit that Lucero was petitioner's sister's brother-in-law
(R. at 79-80; Addendum D).

There was no direct evidence

presented that Lucero was biased at petitioner's trial;
petitioner only testified that he understood that there were hard
feelings between Lucero and petitioner's father (R. at 152;

Addendum C). The court concluded that this testimony was not
sufficient to prove that the juror had any bias (R. at 134;
Addendum B). The record of this proceeding contains ,f'a
reasonable basis . . . to support the trial court's refusal to be
convinced that the writ should [have been] granted.'"

Medina v.

Cook, 779 P.2d 658, 658-59 (Utah 1989) (quoting Bundy v. DeLand,
763 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1988)) (quoting Velasquez v. Pratt, 21
Utah 2d, 229, 232, 443 P.2d 1020, 1022 (Utah 1967)).

The habeas

court properly concluded that petitioner had not established that
he received ineffective assistance at trial and properly denied
the petition for postconviction relief.
POINT III
BECAUSE THIS POINT APPEARS TO BE A
RESTATEMENT OF THE ISSUES RAISED IN THE FIRST
TWO POINTS OF PETITIONER'S BRIEF, IT IS NOT
NECESSARY TO ADDRESS THESE ISSUE A SECOND
TIME.
It is unclear what petitioner appears to be claiming in
point III of his brief.

He appears to be claiming that he did

not receive a fair trial because he lacked the intent to commit
burglary and because juror Lucero lied about his relationship to
petitioner.

These issues were addressed, and shown to be without

error, in the context of ineffective assistance of counsel in the
first two points of this brief.

The effective assistance of

counsel is an issue of a constitutional right to a fair trial.
Frame, 723 P.2d at 405 ("The purpose of the inquiry is simply to
insure that defendant receives a fair trial").

Petitioner has

not provided analysis of a fairness claim in any other context;
consequently, this Court should decline to address the fairness

-11-

issue in any other context.

State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341,

1344 (Utah 1984) ("Since the defendant fails to support this
argument by any legal analysis or authority, we decline to rule
on it").
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests
that this Court affirm the denial of petitioner's petition for
postconviction relief.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this «^0~" day of March, 1991.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

\J>S

!tO

CHARLENE BARLOW
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of
the foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to
Robert Paul Pacheco, petitioner pro se, P.O. Box 250, Draper,
Utah 84020, this
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day of March, 1991.
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
•.

Robert Paul PACHECO, Defendant
and Appellant
Case No. 880281-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Aug. 8, 1989.
Defendant was convicted in the Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, David S.
Young, J., of burglary and theft, and he
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Greenwood, J., held that: (1) pretrial identification procedure was not impermissibly suggestive, and (2) evidence was sufficient to
support convictions.
Affirmed.
1. Constitutional Law <s=>266(3.4)
To determine if preindictment or preinformation photo spread is so suggestive
that subsequent in-court identification violates due process, two-part test is applied:
first, pretrial photographic identification
procedure must be so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to very substantial
likelihood of irreparable misidentification;
second, if photo array is impermissibly suggestive, in-court identification must be
based on untainted, independent foundation
to be reliable. U.S.C.A. ConstAmends. 5,
14.
2. Constitutional haw &*266(B)
In reviewing whether defendant's due
process rights were violated because of
likelihood of misidentification, each case
must be considered under totality of the
circumstances; if identification procedure
gives rise to requisite likelihood of irreparable misidentification, defendant's right to
due process is violated. U.S.C.A. Const.
Amends. 5, 14.
3. Criminal Law <s»339.10(2, 6)
In evaluating likelihood of in-court misidentification after witness views allegedly
suggestive photo spread, factors to be con-

sidered include: opportunity of witness to
view criminal at time of crime, witness*
degree of attention, accuracy of witness*
prior description, level of certainty demonstrated by witness at time of confrontation,
and length of time between crime and confrontation. U.S.C.A. ConstAmends. 5, 14.
4. Criminal Law <s=»339.7(3, 4)
Pretrial identification procedure in
which witness was shown two sets of photo
arrays was not impermissibly suggestive,
although witness was told she had identified the suspect when she tentatively identified defendant after viewing first array,
and was then shown second array in which
defendant was the only repeated person.
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14.
5. Criminal Law <s=>339.10(11)
Witness* in-court identification of defendant was sufficiently independent of her
identification of defendant through allegedly suggestive photographic array to be
admissible in burglary prosecution; witness positively identified defendant at trial,
correctly recited his license plate number
and identified clothes found in his home as
looking like those worn by person she saw
running from victim's house. U.S.C.A.
ConstAmend. 14.
6. Criminal Law <3»1045
Where there is no indication on record
on appeal that trial court reached or ruled
on issue, Court of Appeals will not consider
issue on appeal.
7. Criminal Law <3=»1045
Issue of whether trial court erred in
denying defendant's pretrial motion to suppress evidence of prior conviction for attempted robbery would not be considered
on appeal from defendant's burglary conviction, where defendant did not obtain oral
or written ruling on motion on the record.
8. Criminal Law <3=>899
Any error in admitting set of six photos that were used by witness to identify
defendant and appeared to be booking photos was waived by defendant when defendant subsequently testified as to his prior
conviction, even if photographs arguably

suggest*
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Cite as 778 PJ2d 26 (UtahApp. 1989)

suggested prior criminal record.
1953, 77-35-30(a).

U.C.A.

9. Burglary <s»41(6)
Larceny e=>55
Positive identification of defendant by
witness who observed defendant as he ran
from victim's house was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for theft and
burglary. U.C.A.1953, 76-6-202, 76-6-404.
James A. Valdez, Richard G. Uday, Salt
Lake City, for defendant and appellant.
R. Paul Van Dam, Barbara Bearnson,
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent

testified that when she heard Mr. Welch
yell, she came out of her house. She saw a
male running from across the street to a
car parked near her driveway. Realizing
something was amiss, she ran across the
yard to get a better look. Mrs. Luna was
within about twenty feet of the man and
was able to look at him full face before he
entered the car and drove away. She observed that he wore a red checkered shirt
and beige pants. In addition, she obtained
the license plate number of the blue and
white car the man drove.

GREENWOOD, Judge:
Robert Paul Pacheco appeals from his
jury conviction of burglary, a second degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-202 (1978) and theft, a class B misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-404 (1978). On appeal, Pacheco
claims that identification procedures used
violated his due process rights, that the
trial court erred in admitting evidence of a
prior conviction, that the trial court erroneously admitted into evidence an exhibit consisting of mug shots, and that the evidence
was insufficient to support the convictions.
We affirm.

Detective Paul LaMont ran a check on
the license plate number Mrs. Luna provided, and determined that Pacheco was the
registered owner of the car. Detective LaMont went to Pacheco's house with a
search warrant and removed several shirts
and pants. A few days after the incident,
Detective LaMont showed Mrs. Luna a photo spread consisting of black and white
driver's license photos, including Pacheco's.
Mrs. Luna identified Pacheco as the man
who ran from the Welchs' house, but stated she was not positive. Detective LaMont
told her she had identified the suspect.
About two weeks later, Detective LaMont
showed Mrs. Luna a photo spread containing color photos. The folder containing the
photos was marked " 'Mug' Show-Up Folder." The lower portion of each picture
contained a black placard with the words
"Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office" and a
police identification number. Mrs. Luna
identified Pacheco from the photo spread
as the man she saw on the day in question.

The facts in this case are largely undisputed. On April 7, 1987, at about 3:30
p.m., Ray and Katherine Welch were working in their backyard. Mr. Welch took a
break, went in the back door of his house
and saw a man in the kitchen. The man
ran out the front door and down the street,
jumped into a blue and white car, and
drove away. Mr. Welch later noticed that
between $4 and $50 was missing from his
wallet. Mr. Welch could not identify Pacheco as the man he saw run from his
home that day. Mrs. Welch was outside,
heard her husband yell and saw the man
run to his car. A neighbor, Connie Luna,

During the trial, Mrs. Luna identified a
shirt and a pair of pants seized from Pacheco's home as looking like the clothes worn
by the perpetrator. She also recited, from
memory, Pacheco's license plate number as
the one on the car the perpetrator drove on
the day in question. Mrs. Luna admitted
that when she looked at the first photo
spread she was not positive that she had
identified the person she saw on that day.
She also stated that Pacheco was the only
person appearing in both photo spreads.
Mrs. Luna identified Pacheco at trial and
stated that she was positive that he was
the man she saw on the day in question.

Before BENCH, GREENWOOD and
JACKSON, JJ.
OPINION
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At trial, before Pacheco testified, the
State offered the second group of photographs labeled "'Mug' Show-Up Folder"
into evidence. Pacheco's attorney objected
to the photos on the basis that they appeared to be booking photos and were suggestive and highly prejudicial. The court
overruled the objection and permitted the
photographs to be shown to the jury.
Pacheco took the stand and testified that
he did not commit the burglary and theft.
He claimed that he had loaned his car to his
son on that day, who returned the car
about 5 p.m. Pacheco made no attempt to
locate his son prior to trial and did not
inquire about his son's whereabouts on that
day. The jury found Pacheco guilty of
burglary and theft. This appeal followed.
I. Identification Procedures
On appeal Pacheco claims that the identification procedures were unduly suggestive. Specifically, Pacheco claims that the
police improperly affirmed Mrs. Luna's
first, uncertain identification of him by telling her that she had identified the suspect.
They then returned a couple of weeks later
with another photospread which was labeled "'Mug' Show-Up Folder" and in
which Pacheco was the only repeated person. That identification procedure, Pacheco claims, violated his due process rights
and constitutes reversible error.
[1,2] Showing crime witnesses a number of pictures and asking if they can identify a perpetrator is an identification method which has long been used to identify
those suspected of committing crimes.
State v. Perry, 27 Utah 2d 48, 492 P.2d
1349, 1352 (1972). Resolving questions
about admissibility of identification evidence hinges on assessing reliability of the
evidence. State v. Thamer, 111 P.2d 432,
(1989). In order to promote evidentiary
reliability, law enforcement officials should
conduct identification processes in an impartial, disinterested manner. Id To determine if a pre-indictment or pre-information photo spread is so suggestive that the
subsequent in-court identification violates
due process, we apply a two-part test.

First, the pretrial photographic identification procedure must be so impermissibly
suggestive as to "give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification." Id. Second, if the photo array is
impermissibly suggestive, "the in-court
identification must be based on an untainted, independent foundation to be reliable."
Id; see also Perry, 492 P.2d at 1352. This
standard applies not only to in-court identification, but also to determine the admissibility of testimony concerning out-of-court
identifications. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S.
188, 198, 93 S.Ct. 375, 381, 34 L.Ed.2d 401
(1972). A prior identification of a suspect
may offset implications of suggestiveness
in a subsequent identification. See Thamer, 111 P.2d at 435. In reviewing whether
a defendant's due process rights were violated because of the likelihood of misidentification, each case must be considered under the totality of the circumstances. Id
If the identification procedure gives rise to
the requisite likelihood of irreparable misidentification, defendant's right to due process is violated. Neil, 409 U.S. at 198, 93
S.Ct. at 381 (1972).
[3] In evaluating the likelihood of incourt misidentification, the factors to be
considered include: the opportunity of the
witness to view the criminal at the time of
the crime, the witness's degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness's prior
description, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the time of the
confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation.
Thamer, at 436; Neil, 409 U.S. at 199, 93
S.Ct. at 382.
[4] We first examine the pre-trial identification by Mrs. Luna, to determine if it
was impermissibly suggestive. Several
days after the crime occurred, Detective
LaMont showed Mrs. Luna a group of
black and white photographs. At that time
Mrs. Luna stated she could not make a
positive identification but she pointed out
Pacheco and stated that he looked like the
man. Detective LaMont then told her she
had identified the suspect. A week or two
later, Detective LaMont returned with a
group of color photographs labeled " 'Mug'
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Show-Up Folder." Mrs. Luna identified
Pacheco as the man she saw on the day in
question. According to Mrs. Luna's testimony, Pacheco was the only person repeated in both photo spreads. Mrs. Luna's
identification became positive when she
saw the second group of photographs.
While there may be better ways to provide
photographs than utilized in the second
group of "mug-type shots," and it would be
preferable if the officer had not named
Pacheco as the suspect after the first incident, these acts are not egregious enough
to taint Mrs. Luna's second positive identification. The second photographs simply
allowed Mrs. Luna to clarify her prior identification.
[5] In addition, we find that the in-court
identification by Mrs. Luna was based on
independent factors. Mrs. Luna positively
identified Pacheco at trial, correctly recited
his license plate number and identified
clothes found in his home as looking like
those worn by the person she saw running
from the Welchs' house. Under the totality of the circumstances, we hold that the
photographic identification procedure used
was not so impermissibly suggestive as to
give rise to a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification and that the incourt identification was independently reliable. Thus, Pacheco's due process rights
were not violated by the identification processes.
II. Motion in Limine
[6,7] Pacheco's second claim on appeal
is that the trial court erred in denying his
pretrial motion to suppress evidence of a
prior conviction for attempted robbery.
Pacheco filed a motion in limine prior to
trial. However, Pacheco did not obtain an
oral or written ruling on the motion on the
record. Where there is no indication in the
record on appeal that the trial court
reached or ruled on an issue, this court will
not consider the issue on appeal. Cunningham v. Cunningham, 690 P.2d 549,
552 n. 2 (Utah 1984). Thus, because the
record contains no indication that the trial
court ruled on the motion, or how, we decline to consider the issue.

III. Admissibility of "Mug Shots"
[8] Pacheco also claims that the court
erred in allowing the photographs labeled
as a " 'Mug' Show-Up Folder" to be published to the jury. The photo spread contained pictures of six individuals. The bottom portion of each photo contains a black
placard with the words "Salt Lake County
Sheriffs Office" and a police identification
number. The photographs were admitted
into evidence during the State's case in
chief, prior to Pacheco's testimony and admission that he had previously been convicted of a crime. When the photographs
were offered into evidence, Pacheco's attorney noted, in the presence of the jury, that
the folder contained paper clips and asked
the court to instruct the jury not to "mess
with" the paper clips. At the end of the
State's case, Pacheco's attorney objected to
publishing the exhibit to the jury. He argued that the photos appeared to be booking photos, and were highly prejudicial to
Pacheco in that Pacheco had not yet been
placed on the stand and to testify regarding his prior record. In his opening statement, Pacheco's attorney indicated Pacheco
would testify in his own defense. Movement of the paper clips reveals that each
individual has two connected photos: a profile and a full face photograph.
Generally, the trial court's rulings on
evidentiary matters will not be disturbed
absent a showing "that the court so abused
its discretion that there is a likelihood that
injustice resulted." State v. McClain, 706
P.2d 603, 604 (Utah 1985).
Admissibility of mug shots has not yet
been fully addressed by the Utah appellate
courts. See State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d
942, 945-47 (Utah 1982); State v. Owens,
15 Utah 2d 123, 388 P.2d 797, 798 (1964).
Several courts, however, have adopted the
following three part test to determine
whether or not the introduction of mug
shots constitutes reversible error
1. The Government must have a demonstrable need to introduce the photographs; and
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2. The photographs themselves, if
shown to the jury, must not imply that
the defendant has a prior criminal record;
and
3. The manner of introduction at trial
must be such that it does not draw particular attention to the source or implications of the photographs.
United States v. Torres-Flores, 827 F.2d
1031,1038-39 (5th Cir.1987); United States
v. Fosher, 568 F.2d 207, 214 (1st Cir.1978);
United States v. Harrington, 490 F.2d 487,
494 (2nd Cir.1973); State v. Kutzen, 1 Hawaii App. 406, 620 P.2d 258 (1980).
The admission of improper photographs
has been held to not constitute reversible
error where defendants opened the door
for admission. United States v. Guinn,
454 F.2d 29, 37 (5th Cir.1972) cert denied
407 U.S. 911, 92 S.Ct. 2437, 32 L.Ed.2d 685.
See generally Annotation, Admissibility,
and Prejudicial Effect of Admission, of
"Mug Shot," "Rogues' Gallery11 Photograph, or Photograph Taken in Prison, of
Defendant in Criminal Trial, 30 A.L.R.3d
908 (1970). Also, in United States v.
Davis, 487 F.2d 112, 121 (5th Cir.1973),
cert den. 415 U.S. 981, 94 S.Ct. 1573, 39
L.Ed.2d 878 (1974), the court determined
that where defendant took the stand after
a mug-type photograph had been exhibited
to the jury, and testified as to his prior
felony conviction, the trial court's error, if
any, was cured or waived by defendant's
testimony. The court noted that "[reference to or use by a defendant of an erroneously admitted line of evidence ordinarily
cures or waives error." Id. The Davis
court relied on United States v. Silvers,
374 F.2d 828, 831-32 (7th Cir.1967) where
the court held that defendant waived his
objection to the admissibility of evidence
regarding his prior convictions and incarcerations, by himself presenting evidence
of the prior convictions to assist in his
defense. In Silvers, the court held that
references to defendant's prior convictions
during the State's case was vitiated by
defendant's extensive use of his prior criminal record, and thus did not constitute prejudicial error. Id. at 832.

We are convinced that any error in this
case in admitting the photographs was
waived by Pacheco, as in Silvers, when
Pacheco testified as to his prior conviction.
The photographs arguably may suggest a
prior criminal record, but Pacheco, by his
own testimony, resolved any doubts the
jury may have had when he disclosed his
earlier conviction for attempted robbery.
The error, therefore, if any, was harmless
and does not justify reversal. See Utah
R.Crim.P. 30(a); State v. Johnson, 771
P.2d 1071, 1072-73 (Utah 1989).
IV. Sufficiency of Evidence
[9] Finally, we consider Pacheco's contention that the evidence is insufficient to
support his conviction. In examining a
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
after a jury verdict,
we review the evidence and all inferences
which may reasonably be drawn from it
in the light most favorable to the verdict
of the jury. We reverse a jury conviction for insufficient evidence only when
the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbable
that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he
was convicted.
State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah
1985) (quoting State v. Petree, 659 P.2d
443, 444 (Utah 1983)). Accordingly, we
have reviewed the evidence from the record
and all the inferences which may be drawn
from the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict.
Mr. and Mrs. Welch were in their backyard when the burglary occurred. A man
matching Pacheco's description was seen
on the Welchs' porch by neighbors. Mr.
Welch surprised Pacheco when he entered
the house, and Pacheco ran out of the
house, got in his car and drove away. Mr.
Welch yelled at Pacheco as he ran. A
neighbor, Mrs. Luna, saw Pacheco as he
fled, from only about twenty feet away,
and positively identified him both before
and at trial. She also observed the cloth-
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ing he wore, which was similar to clothing
seized from Pacheco's house, and noted the
license plate number of the car Pacheco
drove. The car was registered to Pacheco.
We conclude that the evidence is not so
inconclusive or improbable that reasonable
minds would reasonably doubt Pacheco
committed the crimes of theft and burglary

and therefore, that there was sufficient
evidence to support the jury's conviction.
Affirmed.
BENCH and JACKSON, JJ., concur.
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R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312)
Attorney General
CHARLENE BARLOW (0212)
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondents
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1021

SALT LAKE COUNTY

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT PAUL PACHECO,

:

Petitioner,

:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

v.

:

M. ELDON BARNES, Warden
Utah State Prison,

t

Case No. 890904474 HC

:

Judge Kenneth Rigtrup

Respondent.

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing
on November 29, 1989, at the hour of 10:00 a.m. before the
Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, Third District Judge.

Petitioner,

Robert Paul Pacheco, was present with counsel, Clayton J. Parr
and Dan H. Matthews.

Respondent was represented by Charlene

Barlow, Assistant Attorney General.

The Court being fully

advised in the premises hereby enters its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law as follows:

00*31

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That petitioner is currently incarcerated in the

Utah State Prison.
2.

That the extent and scope of discovery in criminal

cases differs from that of civil cases; contact by petitioner's
criminal trial counsel with opposing witnesses is limited.
3.

That it was an exercise of judgment for

petitioner's criminal trial counsel to decide not to challenge
the issue of whether money was actually taken during the
burglary.
4.

That petitioner's criminal trial counsel properly

sought to avoid the appearance of taking inconsistent positions
when he chose to not challenge the theft issue.
5.

That petitioner's theory of the criminal case was

that petitioner was not present at the victims' house during the
burglary and theft and that petitioner's criminal trial counsel
followed that theory.

Counsel could have probed the theft issue

further but did not provide ineffective assistance when he did
not do so.
6.

That there has been no evidence presented by

petitioner which demonstrates that the jury process used in his
trial was flawed, or even what the make up of the prospective
panel was.

-2-
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7.

That the jury had been selected and the first day

of petitioner's criminal trial commenced when petitioner raised
the issue of a possible conflict with one of the jurors.
8.

That the record is scant on the inability of the

juror of which petitioner complains to act impartially in
petitioner's trial.

Petitioner merely supposes that the juror

would not have acted impartially because of an alleged conflict
between the juror and petitioner's father.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That petitioner has not demonstrated a substantial

denial of his constitutional rights.
2.

That petitioner has the burden of production and of

proof in establishing his claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel.
3.

That the Court must consider the conduct of trial

counsel very carefully, with the presumption that trial counsel
acted correctly unless petitioner demonstrates actual prejudice
to himself from counsel's conduct.
4.

That petitioner has not demonstrated that his

criminal trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance.
5.

That petitioner has the burden to prove that the

process used to select the jury in his criminal case
systematically excluded a cognizable minority group.
6.

That petitioner has failed to sustain this burden.

-3-
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1.

That petitioner's failure to meet this burden also

demonstrates a failure to prove that his criminal trial counsel
rendered ineffective assistance by not raising a challenge to the
jury selection process.
8.

That petitioner has not met his burden of showing

any bias on the part of the juror of whom he complains.
9.

That petitioner's failure to meet this burden also

demonstrates a failure to prove that his criminal trial counsel
rendered ineffective assistance by not challenging the juror.
DATED this

/5*—"flay of December, 1989.
BY THE COURT:

STH RIGTRUP
District Judge

T&—

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law was mailed,
postage prepaid, to Clayton J. Parr and Dan H. Matthews, Kimball,
Parr, Crockett & Waddoups, Attorneys for petitioner, 185 South
State Street, Suite 1300, P.O. Box 11019, Salt Lake City, Utah
84147, this

H > ^ of December, 1989.

-4-

cc

ADDENDUM C

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

1
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2
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*

3

M

ROBERT PAUL PACHECO,

4

Plaintiff,

5

CIV 890904474 HC

-vs-

6

N. ELDON BARNES,

7

CtoputyCitt

Court's Allowed Transcript
11-29-89

Defend a n t s .

8
9
10

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 29th day of

11
12
13
14
15

November, 1989, at 2:00 o'clock p.m., this cause ca*e
on for Hearing before the HONORABLE KENNETH RIGTRUP,
trict Court, without a jury, in the Salt Lake
Dis<
unty Courthouse, Salt Lake City, Utah.
Co

16
17
18

A P P E A R A N C E S :
For the Plaintiff:

CLAYTON PARR
DAN MATHEWS
Attorneys at Law

For the Defendant:

CHARLENE BARLOW
Attorney at Law

19
20
21
22

CAT by:

CARLTON S. WAY, CSR, RPR

23
24
25

•GO1! 4 7

P R O C E E D I N G S
MR. PARR:

2

I would like to call

3

Mr. Pacheco to the stand for a few brief questions,

4

Your Honor.
THE COURT:

5

You may.
ROBERT PAUL PACHECO. called

6
7

as a witness on his own behalf, after having been duly

8

sworn, testified

as follows:
DIRECT

9
10
11
12

EXAMINATION

BY MR. PARR:
Q.

Just for record, would you please state

your full name?

13

A.

Robert Paul Pacheco.

14

Q.

Where are you currently

15

A.

Utah State Prison.

16

Q.

Mr. Pacheco, when were you committed

17

residing?

to

the Utah State Prison?

18

A.

April 22nd, 1988.

19

Q.

Were you present during the phase of

20

your trial when prospective jurors were questioned by

21

the Judge and by the two attorneys?

22

A.

Yes, I was.

23

Q.

Were the prospective members of the jury

24

asked by the Court, or either of the attorneys

25

present, whether they were related to you or knew you
2

PACHECO
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d

QQ*M

during this questioning?
A.

Yes #

they were,

Q.

Did any of the jury members who were

eventually chosen to serve on the jury answer that
they did know you or were related to you?
A.

No.
MR. PARR:

Your Honor, may I approach

the witness?
THE COURT:
MR. PARR:

You may.
I'm giving him here what's

been marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 1.
is # Your Honor, is the transcript —

well, it is the

front page of the transcript from his trial.
omitted
page.

All this

And

I've

the second page and gone on to the third
At the bottom of the third page # we have a list

of the jurors that were seated

in Mr. Pacheco's case.

Mr. Pacheco, would you please look on
the second page of what I've handed you at the bottom,
And tell me:

Are you related

in any way to any

members of the jury that sat in your case?
A.

Yes.

Q*

To which member of the jury listed here

are you related?
A.

Michael Lucero.

Q.

What is that relationship?
3

PACHECO
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A.

Michael Lucero

is my

sister's

brother-in-law.
Q.

Okay.

M r . Pacheco, did

M r . Lucero when he was being

you

questioned

recognize

as a potential

juror?
A.

No f

Q.

Were you

were related

sir.
aware at that

time that

you

to M r . Lucero?

A.

No.

Q.

So, when did

you discover

that

I discovered

it the night

after

relat ionship?
A.

the

jury

was selected .
Q.

And

A.

My mother

Q.

And

A.

No.

selection
what

the jury.

that

told

me.

She told
Q.

there

home.

she asked

who

She asked

you

the

And

And

me to describe

to her

I told

that was chosen

it w a s .

time?

jury

I explained

me that was my sister's
Did

at the

were at the court.

there was one Hispanic

Michael Lucero.

place?

At the time -- after

took place, I went

And

take

was your mother

the proceedings

her that

so.

how did

for

I mentioned
him.

I did

brother-in-law.

inform M r . Valdez of

this

relationship?
PACHECO
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A,

Yes, I did.

Q»

Now, given the fact that the

relationship

is quite distant, were you concerned

about his presence on the jury?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And why is that?

A*

There was -- I talked with my mother

about it, and she had told me that -MS. BARLOW:

Objection to hearsay, Your

Honor, if his mother is not here to testify.
THE COURT:
MR. PARR:

Sustained.
Your Honor, I -- his mother

is here to testify, and we can call her to the stand,
if we want.
concerned

I believe he can testify as to why he was

about the relationship.

I understand he

can't testify as to what his mother told him, but he
can testify, I believe, as to why he was concerned
about Mr. Lucero on the jury.
Just please limit your questions -THE COURT:

Overruled.

I'll assume that

it's not for the truth of the matter asserted.

You

may proceed.
MR. PARR:
Why were you concerned

Once again, the question is:
-- given the fact that the

relationship was quite distant, why were you
5
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1 J concerned?
21

A.

My understanding was there was hard

3 J feelings between my father and Mr. Lucero.
41

Q.

Okay.

Did you inform Mr. Valdez of your

5 1 concerns, that your father and Mr. Lucero had hard
6 J feelings?
7

A.

Yes, I did.

81

Q.

To the best of your knowledge, did

9 1 Mr. Valdez ever attempt to have Mr. Lucero removed as
10 J a juror?
11

A.

No.

12 1

Q.

To the best of your knowledge, did

13 J Mr. Valdez ever bring the existence of this
14 1 relationship, and the possible bias, to the attention
15

of the Judge?

16

A.

No, he didn f t.

17 1

Q.

Did Mr. Valdez ever ask you to look into

18 1 the matter further and let him know?
19

A.

20

No.
MR. PARR:

That's all the questions I

211 have, Your Honor.
22 1

THE COURT:

23 1

MS. BARLOW:

You may cross.
Thank you. Your Honor.

24
25
I

6
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CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MS. BARLOW:
3
4

Q.

Mr. Pacheco, what exactly did you tell

Mr. Valdez about this relationship with Mr. Lucero?

5

A.

That he was my sister's brother-in-law.

6

Q.

Did you tell him anything else?

7

A.

Well, I mentioned

that my understanding

8

was that a defendant could not have a relation on the

9

jury.

10
11

Q.

Did you s a y ,

"I d o n ' t

think

know h i m .

this

guy

likes me"?

12

A.

No,

13

Q.

You d i d n ' t

15

A.

No.

16

Q.

Did he know of the relationship?

17

A.

I have no idea.

18

Q.

He might have been just as in the dark

14

19

I didn't

know h i m .

Did L u c e r o know

you?

about the relationship as you, is that correct?

20

A.

He may have, yes.

21

Q.

He might not have been lying when he

22

said, "No, I'm not related."

23

aware of the relationship?

He might not have been

24

A.

At the time that he was sworn in?

25

Q.

Yes.
PACHECO
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1

A.

Yes, that could be.

2

Q.

So, your concern is not so much that he

3

lied when he said he wasn't related.

4

that, after you found out about the relationship, you

5

think Valdez should have done something about it?

6

A.

Yes.

7

Q.

That's your concern.
Isn't it true that you told Mr. Valdez

8
9

Your concern is

he might be related

to you?

10

A.

No.

11

Q.

And Mr. Valdez told you, "Well, find out

12

for sure before we go any further"?

13

A.

No.

14

Q.

You don't recall that conversation?

15

A.

It had never taken place.

16

Q.

You are assuming

that the hard

feelings

17

between your father and Mr. Lucero would carry over to

18

his feelings about you, is that correct?

19

A.

I was concerned

about that, yes.

20

Q.

You are concerned

about that, even

21

though he may have not even have known about the

22

relationship?

23

A.

At the time that -- excuse me.

At the

24

time that he took the jury out, I believe he didn't

25

know me.

But, after he had seen my mother testify, I
8
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believe, then, he knew who we were.
Q.

And you are making that assumption?

I

mean, you didn't talk to him directly and say, "Did
you recognize my mother?"
A.

No, ma'am.

That would be tampering

with

the jury.
Q.

My simple question, yes or no answer:

No, you didn't talk to him?
A.

No.
MS. BARLOW:

Your Honor, pending

Mr. Valdez being here to question him, I have no
further questions.
THE COURT:

All right.

THE COURT:

Any redirect?

MR. PARR:

Just one brief question.

Now, you just mentioned, I believe, that
at the time of being sworn in, Mr. Lucero may have not
been aware of the relationship.

But, you believe that

he became aware of that later on, is that correct?
THE WITNESS:
MR. PARR:
concerned

Yes.

And that is why you were

that his hard feelings you said about your

father might carry over?
THE WITNESS:
MR. PARR:

Yes.

I have no further questions.
9

PACHECO

WIT P

X

nn*!^;

THE COURT:

You may step down.

(Court allowed transcript

completed.)
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STATE OF UTAH
ss
County of SALT LAKE

I, CARLTON S. WAY # CSR, do hereby certify that
I am an Certified

Shorthand

Reporter and a Notary

Public in and for the State of Utah;
That I took down the proceedings aforesaid at
the time and place therein named and

thereafter

reduced the same to print by means of computer-aided
transcription

(CAT) under my direction and control;

I further certify that I have no interest in
the event of this action.
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL this the 23rd day of
March, 1990.

rrriXL„CII

(S ignature)

CARLTON S. WAY, CSR #

RPR
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ADDENDUM D

FILED

OIGT^OT COURT

Clayton J. Parr (A3733)
Dan H. Matthews (5511)
KIMBALL, PARR, CROCKETT & WADDOUPS
Attorneys for Petitioner
185 South State Street, Suite 1300
P.O. Box 11019
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
Telephone: (801) 532-7840

OCT 'J :3*:PM'89

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT PAUL PACHECO,
Petitioner,

:
:
:

v.
M. ELDON BARNES, Warden
Utah State Prison,

:
:
:
:

Respondent.

AFFIDAVIT OF
IVY W. PACHECO

Case No. 890904474 HC
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup

Ivy W. Pacheco, being first duly sworn, deposes and
states as follows:
1.

I

make

the

following

affidavit

on

personal

knowledge.
2.

I am the mother of Petitioner, Robert Paul Pacheco.

I reside at 1500 West Parkway Ave., Salt Lake City, Utah 84119.
3.

I was present during the trial of Petitioner, Robert

Paul Pacheco.
4.

I saw Michael Lucero who was a jury member in the

trial of Petitioner. I have personal knowledge that Michael Lucero
is related to Petitioner in that he is Petitioner's sister's

ftfif^n

brother-in-law.
5.

I told Petitioner's counsel at trial, Mr. James

Valdez, that one of the jurors was related to Petitioner.

Ivy W. Pacheco
Notary Public
JOHN R. WOOD

STATE OF UTAH

185 So. State S t #1300
Salt Lake Chy, Utah 84111
My Commission Expires

)

January 5,1993
State of Utah

) ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Subscribed and sworn to before me this
October, 1989.

/^yf rt
My Commission Expires:

rotary

6.

day of

66fa#zr

Public

Residing In

&A*/aA fotfifo

C008I

